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Abstract. Access control is a fundamental concern in any sys- 
tem that manages resources, e.g., operating systems, file systems, 
databases and communications systems. The problem we address 
is how to specify, enforce, and implement access control in dis- 
tributed environments. This problem occurs in many applications 
such as management of distributed project resources, e-newspaper 
and payTV subscription services. 
Starting from an access relation between users and resources, 
we derive a user hierarchy, a resource hierarchy, and a unified hi- 
erarchy. The unified hierarchy is then used to specify the access 
relation in a way that is compact and that allows efficient queries. 
It is also used in cryptographic schemes that enforce the access re- 
lation. We introduce three specific cryptography based hierarchical 
schemes, which can effectively enforce and implement access con- 
trol and are designed for distributed environments because they do 
not need the presence of a central authority (except perhaps for set- 
UP). 
Keywords: Distributed access control, access hierarchies, informa- 
tion and communication security. 
Note: This work was conducted when G .  Noubir and J.-C. Birget 
were visiting the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. J.-C. Birget and 
B. Ramamurthy were supported in part by NSF grants. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The domain we consider in this paper is that of distributed appli- 
cations in environments such as distributed operating systems, dis- 
tributed database systems, and communication networks where dif- 
ferent users access different resources with different access rights. 
This problem is called distributed access control. Typical examples 
include access to rooms (e.g., class and lab) in a building, man- 
agement of project resources, e-newspaper and payTV subscription 
services. 
For example, in the context of management of project resource, 
users include directors, group leaders, project managers, technical 
managers, engineers, consultants, administrative staff, customers 
and accounting staff. Resources include financial data, intemal 
technical documents, public project documents, laboratories, etc. 
Different users have different access rights to different resources, 
which need to be concisely specified and correctly enforced. 
Access control deals with the specification and enforcement of 
users’ access permissions (and access restrictions) relative to the 
resources of a system. This is a fundamental concern in any sys- 
tem that manages resources, e.g., operating systems, file systems, 
databases and communications systems. Traditionally, access con- 
trol is specified by an access relation (or “access matrix”) that lists 
explicitly which users can access which resources. 
In this paper we uncover a user hierarchy and a resource hier- 
archy, that are implicit in any access relation. Intuitively the hier- 
archies arise from the fact that some users have more access rights 
than others, and some resources carry more access constraints than 
others (a formal definition will be given later). We show that these 
hierarchies can give useful information. 
Another contribution of this paper is an algorithm that merges 
these implicit user and resource hierarchies into a single hierarchy. 
This unified hierarchy contains the user and resource hierarchy as 
sub-hierarchies; moreover, a user is above a resource in the unified 
hierarchy if and only if this user has access to this resource. Thus 
the unified hierarchy contains all the information of the access rela- 
tion, while also displaying the useful hierarchy information. In ad- 
dition, the unified hierarchy merges ‘equivalent’ users, and merges 
‘equivalent’ resources (rigorous definitions will be given); thus the 
unified hierarchy will usually be a compact description of the access 
rights. 
Having a unified hierarchy can simplify access control. The 
literature contains secure access control protocols [I, 3, 6, 8, 101 
that assume (without justification) that we have such a pre-existing 
unified hierarchy (see Subsection 3.4). We show how various secure 
access control schemes make use of hierarchy information in order 
to enforce access permissions and restrictions. 
For a centralized system, access control is usually implemented 
by a centrally stored access table [2, 5, 7, 11, 121. However, appli- 
cations in distributed environments call for distributed access con- 
trol (e.g., networks, Intemet, distributed databases, web services, 
distributed operating systems, satellite-TV, etc.). In Section 3 we 
give access control schemes that are specifically designed for dis- 
tributed applications. 
In this paper we do not consider the dynamics of access control 
(when users and resources are added and removed and when access 
rights change). Our results are applicable when systems change 
only slowly. Dynamical distributed access control is a very difficult 
problem that does not have easy solutions. We have been studying 
the problem by beginning with restricted domains and have pro- 
posed some dynamic hierarchical access control schemes for spe- 
cific applications fields such as tree-hierarchies and secure group 
communications [ 131. 
To illustrate the hierarchies we will use the following simple 
example, inspired from a college environment. The users, the re- 
sources, and the access relation (user-dominant adjacency lists) are 
given as follows (see box). We will derive a unified hierarchy for 
these relations in Section 2 .  
In the next section we define the user and resource hierarchies 
as well as the unified hierarchy and prove the existence and unique- 
ness of the unified hierarchy. In Section 3, we discuss the speci- 
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fication of an access relation (in particular, using the unified hier- 
archy) and introduce three cryptography based schemes which en- 
force the access relation; these schemes use the unified hierarchy 
and are specifically designed for distributed applications. 
prof1 -+ c l ,  c lA,  c3, labl, lab2, prl, pr2 
prof2 -+ c2, c3, labl, lab2, prl, pr2 
grStul -+ clA, c3, labl, lab2, pr2 
grStu2 -+CIA, c3, labl, lab2, pr2 
ugrStul -+ c3, labl, lab2, pr2 
ugrStu2 -+ c3, labl, lab2, pr2 
ugrStulOO -+ c3, labl, lab2, pr2 
secr -+ c3, prl ,  pr2 
sysMgr -+ all resources 
sysHelp -+ all resources except c l  and c2 
2. IMPLICIT HIERARCHIES IN AN ACCESS RELATION 
A hierarchy is formalized by a directed acyclic graph 
(DAG), which defines a partial order (“hierarchical order”) among 
vertices. A vertex vi is below a vertex vJ in the hierarchical order 
(vi 5 vj) if and only if there exists a directed path in the graph 
from vj to vi. 
Let U = { U I  , u2, . . . } be the set of users in the system, and 
let R = { T I ,  T Z :  . . . }  be the set of resources in the system. The 
access relation A of the system determines which resources each 
user can legally access and use: 
A = { ( U ,  r )  E U x R : the user U can access the resource r} .  
For a user U E U ,  let R(u) C R denote the set of resources that 
U can access; for a resource r 6 R ,  let U ( r )  C U denote the set of 
users that can access r .  So, ( U ,  r )  E A is equivalent to T E R(u),-  
and also equivalent to U E U ( T ) .  In the following, we assume that 
the complete access relation is known, and hence all the sets R(u) 
and U ( T )  are known. 
The user and resource hierarchies are defined as follows: 
Definition 1. Let ui, uj E U ,  ri,  rj E R. 
R(uj) (i.e., ui is below uj 
in the user hierarchy if and only if the resources that ui can access 
form a subset of the resources that uj can access). 
ri < R  rj ifand only i f U ( r j )  C U(r i )  (i.e., T?  is below rj in 
the resource hierarchy ifand only ifevery user that can accessrj 
can also access rz). 
ui EU uj ifand only i fR(ui)  = R(uj);  so, two users are 
equivalent (regarding access control) ifand only ifthey have exactly 
the same access rights. 
ri E R  r j  ifand only i fU(r i )  = U(r j ) ;  so two resources are 
equivalent (regarding access control) if and only if they are acces- 
sible by exactly the same users. 
ui <U uj ifand only i fR(ui)  
Note that the subset order is reversed for resources, compared 
to users. 
The ‘order’ relations defined so far are in general not antisym- 
metric (i.e., z 5 y and z 2 y does not imply z = y; see e.g., 
[4]). To obtain partial orders we merge equivalent (ZU) users 
into single groups, and we merge equivalent resources into single 
groups. Note that the result is the same, whether we first merge 
equivalent users, and then equivalent resources, or vice-versa. From 
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now on, when we say “user” (or “resource”), we will mean a group 
of equivalent users (respectively, resources). The set of users U, the 
set of resources R, and the access relation A will refer to groups 
from now on. 
Example: For our example from the Introduction, the Figures 1 and 
2 represent the user and the resource hierarchies with several meg-  
ers between users and resources, obtained from the access relation. 
Figure 1 : User hierarchy 
Figure 2:  Resource hierarchy 
Now (after merging equivalent users, and merging equivalent 
resources), the users form a partial order (P.o.), called the user hi- 
erarchy, and denoted by (U, s ~ ) ;  similarly, the resources form a 
p.o., called the resource hierarchy, and denoted by (R, 5 ~ ) .  
We will now combine the user hierarchy and the resource hier- 
archy into a unified hierarchy, defined as follows: 
Definition 2. Let (U,  < U )  and ( R ,  < R )  be p.0.s (user hierurchv, 
resource hierarchy respectively), obtained from an access relation 
A. The unified hierarchy is a p.0. (V, 5)  satisfiing the following 
conditions: 
( 1 )  The user hierarchy is a sub-p.0. of the unified hierarchy; this 
means: (U,  < U )  is embedded into the p.0. (V, 3) by a one-to-one 
map f~ : U -+ V ,  such that for all ui, I L ~  E U:  ui <U uj ifand 
( 2 )  Similarly, the resource hierarchy is a sub-p.0. of the uniJied 
hierarchy; this means: (R ,  < R )  is embedded into the p.0. (V, 5 )  
by a one-to-one map f R  : R -+ V ,  such that for all r i ,  r j  E R:  
ri I R  rj  ifand only i f f ~ ( r i )  5 f ~ ( ~ j ) .  
(3) A user U E U has access to a resource T E R if and only if 
U is above T in the unijied hierarchy; thus, U has access to r if and 
on ly i f fR ( r )  5 f u ( u ) .  
( 4 )  Thep.0. (V, 5 )  is the sma1lestp.o. (regarding the size ofV), 
satisfying (I), (2), (3). 
onz?JiffU(ui) 5 f U ( U j ) .  
The following theorem shows that a unified hierarchy, as just 
defined, exists and is not larger than the combined size of the two 
original user and resource hierarchies. 
We will use the notation x y to mean y 5 2. 
Theorem 1. For any user hierarchy (U ,  <U) (a p.0.) and any re- 
source hierarchy (R ,  s ~ )  (a p . ~ . )  there exists a uniJed hierarchy 
(V, 5)  (a p.0. as defined above), and this p.0. is unique up to ‘iso- 
morphism’ (i.e., up to renaming the elements of V).  For the size IVI 
ofV we have: JVI 5 IUI + lRJ. 
Moreovel; (V, 5 )  can be constructed from (U,  5 U )  and (R,  < R 
) in polynomial time. 
Proof. We use the classical notation 2 R  for the set of all subsets of 
R. We will construct the unified hierarchy (V, 3) as a sub-p.0. of 
the p.0. ( z R ,  G). (Analogously, we could have based the construc- 
tion on 2u,  which would have been quite similar.) 
( 1 )  We embed the user hierarchy (U,  < U )  into (2”, C_) by the map 
(So, f ~ ( u i )  consists of the resources that ui can access.) Then fu 
is one-to-one (since we merged equivalent users), anduz $I uj if 
and only if fu(ui)  G fu(uj) (by the very definition of < U ) .  
(2) We embed the resource hierarchy (R ,  5 ~ )  into the p.0. ( a R ,  C) 
by the map f~ : ri E R ----f f ~ ( r i )  = { r j  E R : rj S R  ri}. 
Then f~ is one-to-one (because s~ is a P.o.), and ri <R rj if and 
only if f ~ ( r % )  c f ~ ( r j )  (again because <R is a p.0.). 
(3) The third condition of the definition then holds: ui can access rj 
if and only if rj E R(u,) if and only if ( h k  I R  r j )  r k  E R(ui) 
if and only if f ~ ( ~ j )  
Let V = {tu(.) : u E U }  U { ~ R ( T )  : r E R} & 2R.  Then the 
p.0. (V, C) satisfies conditions (l), (2), (3) of the definition (with C 
playing the role of 5). 
fu : E U -+ fu(ui) = R(w) E 2R.  
fr~(u~). 
Also, clearly IV/ < IUI + IRI. 
It is easy to implement the construction of (V, 5 )  in polynomial 
Minimality of (VI and uniqueness of the minimal unified hier- 
time; note that we need not consider all of 2 R  in the construction. 
archy will follow from the following lemma. 
Lemma: For any minimal unified hierarchy (V, 5)  obtained from 
(U,  < U )  and (R ,  < R ) ,  with embedding maps fu and f~ we have: 
f u (u i )  = f ~ ( r j )  if and only if R(ui) = { r k  : r k  <R r j} .  
Proof of the Lemma: By the definition of the unified hierarchy, 
fu(u,) = f ~ ( r j )  if and only if ui can access rj (and hence the 
descendants of r j ) ,  and no other resources (if ui could access an- 
other rk, then f ~ ( ~ j )  = fu(ui) ? f ~ ( r k )  hence rj >R r k ) .  This 
proves the Lemma. 
Minimality of our construction then follows: Indeed, from the 
definition, V must contain U and R (via one-to-one maps). To 
make IVI smaller than IUI+ [RI, the embedding maps must identify 
some ui’s with some rj’s. But the Lemma tells us a necessary and 
sufficient condition for this to happen. In our construction based 
on 2 R ,  all these possible identifications do happen, hence IV/ is 
minimal. 
Now we can also prove that our construction has minimum size: 
Let V’ be any minimum-size unified hierarchy containing copies of 
U and R (via embedding maps fL, fk), according to Def. 2. For 
(V’I to be smaller than ( U (  + I RI, the embedding maps must identify 
some u E U with some r E R: & ( U )  = fk(r)(E V’). 
Since &(U)  = fk(r) we conclude that u can access r (by (3) of 
Def. 2), and hence {r3 E R : r3 
On the other hand, if u can access some resource r3 then (again by 
point (3) of Def. 2), f&(r3)  5 fL(u)(= f&(r ) ) .  Hence (by point 
(2) of Def. 2), r j  <R r. Therefore, 
The two set-inclusions imply: 
Then it follows from the Lemma above, that u and r are also iden- 
tified in our construction of V above. So, our construction of V 
makes every identification that any minimum-size unified hierarchy 
V’ will do, so our construction is of minimum-size too. 
Uniqueness also follows: different minimal unified hierarchies 
can only differ in the way uz’s are identified with r3’s. But the 
Lemma tells us that this can only be done in one way. 
r }  R(u). 
R(u) c {r3 E R : r j  <R r} .  
If f&(u) = f&(r)  then R(u) = {r3 E R : rg I R  r} .  
This proves the Theorem. 0 
The definition of the unified hierarchy does not tell us explicitly 
what it means for a resource to be above a user u 5 r). From the 
construction one can derive the following (and the proof is straight- 
forward): 
Proposition In the unified hierarchy the following are equivalent 
(where u is a user and r is a resource): 
u 5 r ;  
every resource accessible by u is <R r ;  
every user of r is 
for every user U% of r and every resource rj accessible by u we 
have: ui can access r j ;  
the Cartesian product U ( T )  x R(u) is a subset of A. 
Example: For the example of the Introduction, Figure 3 represents 
the unified hierarchy. Note that some users have been merged with 
resources. 
U ;  
ugrStul 
U rStulW 
Figure 3: Unified hierarchy 
3. IMPLEMENTATION OF ACCESS CONTROL 
In this section we use the hierarchies that we introduced in order to 
develop secure access control schemes. Hierarchies can be used for 
both the specification and the enforcement of access control. In our 
enforcement schemes, a user uZ has to prove to a resource rj that ui 
has the right to access r j ,  and this should be possible if and only if 
rj 5 ui with respect to the unified hierarchy. We will present three 
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basic means to enforce access control: certificates, unconditionally 
secure keying schemes, and computationally secure keying schemes 
(based on one-way functions). 
3.1. Specification of access control 
An access control relation can be given explicitly, by an access ma- 
trix, which can be useful for theoretical reasonings but is wasteful 
for space. A more compact description of the access control rela- 
tion can be given by adjacency lists: user-dominant adjacency lists 
or resource-dominant adjacency lists. 
The un@d hierurchv can also be used to describe the access re- 
lation. In this case, the hierarchy is given as a graph in which every 
vertex is labeled by the set of equivalent user:; or resources (or some 
of both) that are represented by this vertex. Because of the merger 
of equivalent users or resources, and the merger of some users with 
some resources, the unified hierarchy is a representation which is as 
compact as (and usually more compact than) the adjacency list rep- 
resentation. Moreover, the unified hierarchy has the advantage that 
certain queries are more efficient: Given a u:jer ui or a resource rj 
i t  is easy to find the adjacency list of ui or rj (namely, pick all the 
resources that are 5 ui, respectively, all the: users that are t rj) .  
In the user-dominant adjacency list representation, it is tedious to 
find a resource’s adjacency list; on the other hand, if both user- 
and resource-dominant adjacency lists are explicitly given, storage 
is wasted. In the rare cases when no mergers occur, the unified hi- 
erarchy loses its compactness advantage (however, one still has to 
consider the concepts and go through some of the construction of 
the unified hierarchy, in order to find out that no users are merged 
with resources). In any case, the unified hierarchy keeps an advan- 
tage regarding queries. Thus, the unified hierarchy could serve as 
a representation of the access relation, which is both compact and 
efficient for queries. 
Various mixed representations of the access relation are also 
possible: we might be given partial information about adjacency 
lists, about the user and resource hierarchies, or information about 
equivalence of some users or some resources. This may arise in 
specifications, and one could be asked to reconstruct the entire uni- 
fied hierarchy from these data. 
In a distributed environment, partial information about the ac- 
cess relation or the unified hierarchy will be distributed among the 
users and the resources; no central authority is needed (except may 
be at the set-up of the system or for occasional maintenance and 
updates). 
In the next three subsections we give schemes for enforcing an 
access relation. 
3.2. Certificate-based schemes 
In these schemes a trusted certificate authority (CA) distributes cer- 
tificates to users. When a user accesses a resource the protocol is 
as follows: the user provides an access request along with a certifi- 
cate. The resource then verifies the user’s access right based on this 
certificate (without consulting the CA). 
It is natural to assume that users know which resources they can 
access. A user ut may have a certificate of the following form for 
each resource r j  that 21% can access: 
Here, u2’s ID identifies the user, (U, ,  r j )  indicates the access right, 
and the CA’s digital signature certifies to the resource that the infor- 
mation in the certificate is correct. We refer to books on cryptogra- 
phy for more information on certificates and digital signatures (e.g., 
[ u t ’ s  ID, (u , . r3) ,  c e r t .  -valid-time, CA-sig. ] 
~91). 
Alternatively, instead of having a different certificate for each 
resource that u2 can access, ut might have just one certificate that 
lists all of R(u,) (i.e., all the resources accessible tow,%). This ap- 
proach may be simpler when the number of resources is small; but 
it gives more information to a resource than this resource needs to 
know. 
In any case, no information about the access relation or the hi- 
erarchies needs to be stored in the resources. 
A disadvantage of this scheme comes from a general problem 
with certificates: it is hard to keep certificates up to date when the 
system changes (the revocation problem - see [9]). 
3.3. Unconditionally secure keying schemes 
In this approach every vertex U in the unified hierarchy has a key 
IC,. Moreover, depending on the unified hierarchy order 5,  each 
user at v knows a set of keys U, C {kW : w 5 U }  (i.e., the user 
knows some keys of lower-ranking resources), and each resource at 
vertex U knows a set of keys R, C {kW : U 5 w} (i.e., some: keys 
of higher-ranking users); the sets U, and R, should be chosen in 
such a way that 
vi 5 v j  if and only if U,, r l  Rut # 0. 
Moreover, the sets U, and R, should be such that one cannot guess 
any key contained in any of these sets. In particular, we assume that 
the keys IC, are long enough so that they cannot be guessed. 
When a user uj (at vertex v j )  requests a resource ri (at vertex 
vi) he presents his set UUj to the resource; the resource then checks 
whether Uvj n Rv7 # 0, which holds if and only if vi 5 v j ,  iie., if 
and only if u3 has the right to access ri. (In this protocol, a resource 
can get information about the keying material held by users; this 
could however be avoided by adding ‘challenge-response’ methods 
into the protocol - see [9].) 
We will illustrate this approach by simple special cases, namely 
‘user multiple keying’, ‘resource multiple keying’, and ‘mixed key- 
ing’. 
User multiple keying: 
In this scheme we have for every vertex U :  R, = {k,} and 
This scheme can also be implemented by directly using the ac- 
cess relation: Then for every resource r and every user U we have 
R, = {k,} and U, = {IC,? : U can access r j } .  
A user U requesting access to a resource r presents U, to r. The 
resource r verifies U’S access right by checking whether I C ,  E U,. 
For example (see Figure 4), U,, = { I C Z ,  k4, ICs}, R?,* = 
{ k z } .  R,, = {h}, R,, = {kg},  therefore user U P  can access 
resources rz ,r4,  and 7-5. 
U, = { k V 3  : vj i v } .  
Resource multiple keying: 
of user and resources switched. 
This scheme is similar to User multiple keying, with the roles 
Mixed keying: 
This is the general case. For example (see Figure 5) ,  U,, = 
{ k1 , kg}, and R,, , R,, , R,, , J1U6 contain the key k l ,  so the user 
at vertex VI can access the resources at V Z ,  213,214, 216, and he can 
also access the resource at 215 because they share k5. One can check 
from the graphs that 21% 5 vj if and only if R,, n U,, # 0 
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R-sets U-sets 4. CONCLUSION 
We showed that three hierarchies can be extracted from an access 
relation: a user hierarchy, a resource hierarchy, and a unified hi- 
erarchy. These hierarchies allow compact specifications of access 
control, and are useful for schemes that enforce an access relation. 
Cryptographic key-based hierarchical schemes can be designed to 
effectively enforce and implement access control in distributed en- 
vironments. Other issues such as general dynamic access control 
and specification of negative access relations are challenging prob- 
lems which we plan to investigate in the future. 
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